This paper examines how the distribution of target ownership is related with takeover premium in "owner-manager" dominant acquisitions, in which a firm is managed by managers and directors nominated and directed closely by controlling shareholders. We find that there exists the agency problem between owner-managers and non-controlling shareholders. To resolve the agency problem, it is found that the presence of institutional shareholding could be effective.
INTRODUCTION
One of the distinguishable characteristics of Asian publicly listed companies would be the dominance of "owner-managers," in which a firm is managed by managers and directors nominated by controlling shareholders. Because some of controlling shareholders sometimes become managing directors or because controlling shareholders closely direct professional managers through various means such as hierarchy or long-term relational bondage, in many cases, the interests of managers and controlling shareholders are aligned tightly. Thus, the owner-managers could have incentives to behave to maximize the benefits of controlling shareholders rather than those of all shareholders including minority shareholders (La Porta at la, 1999; Johnson et la, 2000; Bae, Kang and Kim, 2002) . In this circumstance, the imbalance of control power between owner-managers vs. (non-controlling) shareholders would be a central issue not only to the corporate governance study, but also to investors and securities legislation 1 .
Mergers and acquisitions could be excellent experiments to test the valuation effects of corporate governance structure (Stulz, Walking and Song, 1990; Moeller, 2005) . First, they require active participation of all decision makers, namely, managers, directors, and shareholders. Managers negotiate the acquisition, directors endorse it and are sometimes involved in the negotiations, and shareholders have to either vote on it or decide whether to tender their shares. Second, the effect of the corporate governance structure on the value of the target, given appropriate control for other influences, is immediately observable in the takeover premium.
This paper examines how the ownership structure of a target firm influences takeover premium in the mergers and acquisitions of owner-manager dominant firms. Particularly, we address the hypotheses concerning the impact of agency conflicts between owner-managers and non-controlling shareholders on the way the value is created: How does owner-manager ownership affect acquisition payoffs? If there exists the agency problem, can the presence of non-controlling large shareholders such as institutional investors be an agency control mechanism? This paper also considers how the bidder holding of target shares before a bid (toehold) affects and how the bidder's chaebol membership affects target's acquisition payoffs.
The result shows that the effect of owner-management shareholding is negatively significant.
It implies that there exists the agency problem between owner-managers and non-controlling 4 shareholders in the sample of Korean acquisitions. The result also suggests that the presence of institutional shareholding is an effective agency control mechanism to resolve the potential agency problem. Shares held by the bidder before a bid has a positively significant impact. It indicates that the bidder's action to accumulate shares before a bid may signal that the deal is excellent and that there is synergy to be realized much more than known to outsiders. The chaebol membership of a bidder has no significant impact on the takeover premium.
In two ways, this paper differs from the previous research in the Korean M&A and ownership structure. While most of the previous studies including Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) and Cho and Jun (2004) consider the 'bidder' ownership structure possibly due to lack of target data, this paper focuses on the effect of 'target' ownership structure on the firm value. Considering that target managers and non-management target blockholders could have different incentives in the event of a takeover attempt (Stulz et al., 1990; Moeller, 2005) , it seems more meaningful to investigate the effect of target ownership structure on the takeover premium.
In the study, the sample period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) ) is updated to incorporate significant current events such as Asian financial crisis in 1997 and Korean M&A market liberalization around The paper is organized as follows: the second section discusses the theoretical framework; the third section presents the hypotheses regarding the impact of ownership structure; in the fourth section, the methodology and sample are described; the fifth section discusses the results; and the final section provides conclusions.
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In the neoclassical framework, managers' acquisition decisions are supposed to enhance shareholder wealth (Salter and Weinhold, 1979; Seth, 1990) . In this view, the objectives of managers' acquisition decisions are tightly aligned with those of shareholders, say, to maximize the overall shareholder value. Managers are assumed to behave to maximize the benefits of all shareholders including minority shareholders.
A competing view is the agency problem, in which managers (as agent) may not always act 5 in the interests of all the shareholders (as principal), and may pursue their own self-interest (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) . Applying the agency problem between managers and shareholders into the cases of 49 countries, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) assert that "the central agency problem in large corporations around world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholder." Johnson et la. (2000) argue further that the owner-managers or controlling shareholders have strong incentives for 'tunneling,' say, to siphon overall shareholder wealth from the firm for the benefit of the owner-managers. Their views imply that the owner-managers behave to maximize the benefits of controlling shareholders rather than maximizing that of all shareholders including minority shareholders.
Partly due to cultural propensity, in many Asian countries including Korea, the agency problem between owner-managers and non-controlling shareholders appears more serious than that between professional managers and shareholders as often observed in the developed western countries like US where ownership and management is clearly divided and secured (La Porta et la., 1999; Johnson et la., 2000; Bae, Kang and Kim, 2002; Cho and Jun, 2004) . In fact, there are many listed companies in Korea whose controlling shareholders (ownership) play a critical role in managing their company directly or indirectly (management). Some other reasons for this phenomenon may include a short age of capitalism experience (i.e., a founder is still managing) and the underdeveloped market for professional managers. In any event, no longer important is the potential conflict between professional managers and shareholders, which has been a central issue for many previous literatures. Rather, for some companies in Korea, Asia and Latin America, more crucial is the potential conflict between owner-managers and noncontrolling shareholders, which this paper attempts to examine.
In this circumstance, unless there are mechanisms in place to control this agency conflict, managerial decisions in acquisitions may be made not to maximize overall shareholder wealth, but to siphon the wealth of overall shareholders to the owner-managers. In the corporate governance literature, the agency control mechanisms include the ownership by non-controlling large institutional shareholders. In the acquisition literature, the stake held by the bidder in the target prior to the bid or toehold is regarded as a control mechanism.
In this paper, using the cases of Korean mergers and acquisitions where owner-managers play an important role in making acquisition decisions, the two competing views are examined within the context of owner-managers and non-controlling shareholders. Furthermore, this paper explores the effect of the target ownership structure on the takeover premiums in order to examine how effectively the agency monitoring mechanisms control the agency conflict.
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Owner-Managers and Agency Problem
In the neoclassical framework, increased managerial ownership by controlling shareholders would encourage diligence and reduce incentives to make poor acquisition decisions because owner-managers bear a higher fraction of the cost from such poor decisions. Thus, it is expected that managerial equity has a positive impact on target shareholder wealth (Stuiz, Walkling and Song, 1990; Song and Walkling, 1993) .
In the agency framework, when they possess a large portion of firm directly or indirectly, the target owner-managers can control the firm and make non-controlling shareholder intervention costly. For instance, the large ownership can allow more seats in the board. In this circumstance, due to the agency conflict between owner-managers and non-controlling shareholders, even when a bid is value additive to their shareholders, the target management (controlling shareholders) may resist the bid and launch various defensive strategies to frustrate it (see Ruback, 1988; and Moeller, 2005) . Managerial resistance to a bid may be influenced by the managerial need for independence. While golden parachutes may increase bid premium, many other actions such as stock repurchases, sale of crown jewels, and poison pills may reduce the incentive for bidders to bid, diminish the probability of a winning bid and entrench incumbent target managers (Ruback, 1988) . Thus, it is expected that managerial equity has a negative impact on target shareholder wealth (Moeller, 2005) . The two competing views are examined using the hypotheses as follows:
H 11 : Target shareholder wealth gains increase, with large owner-managerial shareholdings due to managerial alignment (the neoclassical model).
H 12 : Target shareholder wealth gains decrease, with large owner-managerial shareholdings due to managerial entrenchment (the Moeller model).
Institutional Shareholders as Agency Monitors
One agency control mechanism to increase managerial alignment is monitoring by large (non-controlling) institutional blockholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that due to efficient monitoring from large institutional shareholders, the target firm will be highly valued prior to the bid. Thus, the value creation that the bidder can bring about will be small and the subsequent bid premium will be small. Furthermore, Pound (1988) argues that there may be 7 situations where the potential monitoring effectiveness of institutional shareholders may be diminished by other influences. For example, such shareholders may 'sell and quit' rather than seek an activist role to improve management performance. Institutional shareholders also have low marginal capital gains tax rates, and are more likely to tender for a given premium.
Consequently, the larger the fraction of low-tax shareholders, the lower the premium offered by the bidder and the smaller the target's share of the takeover gain for a given total takeover gain.
Since institutional investors are generally in low tax brackets, the target's share of the takeover gain should be inversely related to the fraction of target equity held by institutions. This leads us to our second hypothesis: One perspective is that a toehold lowers the threshold of potentially profitable acquisitions and hence the average bid premium paid to target shareholders. Grossman and Hart (1980) propose toehold as a solution to the free-rider problem. In their model, toehold helps bidders make profitable acquisitions and bidder shareholders will thereby gain while target shareholders lose (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990) .
A competing perspective is that the bid premium which reflects the post-acquisition value of the target is a positive function of toehold. Choudhry and Jegadeesh (1994) posit an information asymmetry model in which a toehold is a bidder's signal of the post-acquisition value of the target. The higher this value is, the larger the toehold is.
In the Korean cases, it is expected that the impact of toehold is positive because one major motive for mergers and acquisitions in Korea during 1996-2007 is to realize the growth synergy by taking advantage of the restructuring opportunity as claimed by Cho (2007) . When they know the deal is very attractive because of excellent restructuring opportunity available, the bidder may want to buy more toeholds when shares are cheaper before the bid.
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H 3 : Target shareholder wealth gains increase, with bidder's toehold due to the signal of higher post-acquisition value of the target.
Chaebol effect
There are two competing views regarding the role of bidder's membership in a chaebol on the premium of a bid: the "value-added view" and the "tunneling view." Khanna and Pelepu (2000) suggest that a business group adds value to its member firms. When markets are not well developed or accessible, for example, the chaebol membership can add value by providing internally a necessary capital or captive market. On the other hand, Johnson and et. la. (2000) argue that the chaebol membership can deteriorate value by providing the controlling shareholders of the chaebol as a whole with an opportunity to siphon out the wealth of a target.
If the "value-added view" holds true, when a bidder belongs to a chaebol group, shareholders would experience significant wealth gains because the target can create value through captive market or internal capital market. The positive significant coefficients imply the existence of positive chaebol effect. If the "tunneling view" holds true, on the other hand, shareholders would experience significant wealth loss because it can be expected that the wealth of the target would be eventually tunneled to the controlling shareholders of the chaebol. To examine the two views, a hypothesis is derived as follows:
H 4 : Shareholder wealth gains increase, with large chaebol shareholdings (bidder) due to internal capital and captive market. Or, if a bidder belongs to a chaebol, target shareholder wealth gains increase.
METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE
The wealth experience of the shareholder groups is estimated by means of the traditional event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985) . Daily returns data are used and the market model parameters are estimated over the period -250 to -6 trading days prior to the bid 
Control Variables
These variables endeavor to capture the important impacts other than ownership structure. As Cho (2007) maintains, the crucial synergy for shareholder value creation in 10 the Korean acquisitions includes operational and growth synergy. The influence from the operational and growth synergy is controlled by using a proxy for operational synergy (RELATE) and a proxy for growth synergy (GAPGROW), respectively.
The bid process characteristics are also controlled. MULTIBID is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target has multiple bidders in the deal process. MERGER is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal type is merger. Otherwise, the deal type is tender. CASH is the method of payment offered by the bidder as consideration for the acquisition. Two methods of payment are included: cash and equity. Each method of payment is coded as a dichotomous variable. TIME is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction is announced during 1997-2000 period to control the IMF effect. Otherwise, TIME is 0. The target's market capitalization of equity a priori a bid (TGTSIZE) controls the size effect of targets. COMPLETE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is complete. Otherwise, COMPLETE is 0.
RESULTS
The Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) based on the market model for the period Day -5 to Day +5 are used as our measure of wealth gains to shareholders (-1 to +1 shows the similar results). Over the period Day -5 to Day +5, target shareholders earn -1.26%, significant at 1 %.
The combined value-weighted CAR to the portfolio of bidders and targets in our sample is 0.49% (significant at 1%). Thus, the sample mergers slightly create value overall. Considering that bidders gain (1.97% at 1% significance) and targets lose, there is a wealth transfer from target to bidder shareholders. This may imply that bidders have underpaid for their acquisitions. The significant negative coefficient of owner-managers ownership supports our hypothesis H 1 that owner-managers have more incentives for managerial entrenchment rather than alignment with minor shareholders (Ruback, 1988; Moeller, 2005) . The result implies that in the ownermanagers dominated countries the agency framework between owner-managers and noncontrolling shareholders is more relevant than the neoclassical framework. It also suggests that the minority-protection systems are necessary to remedy such inefficiency (La Porta, et la.,
Characteristics of Ownership and Control Variables

1999).
The negative coefficient of institutional ownership (TGTINST) supports our hypothesis H 2 that due to efficient monitoring in the pre-bid period or low tax bracket, the bid premium will be small. This result is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Stulz et al. (1990) and Slusky and Caves (1991) . The result implies that large outside institutional blockholders can intervene the strong owner-management at a low cost.
The positive impact of BIDTOE lends support to our hypothesis H 3 that with increasing bidder's toehold the average bid premium increases. This result is consistent with the signaling model of Choudhry and Jegadeesh (1994) , but contradicts the Hirshleifer and Titman model (1990) . It implies that bidder's action before a bid to accumulate some target shares may signal that the deal is excellent and that there is synergy to be realized much more than known to outsiders.
The chaebol effect (BID30GRP) is not significant, suggesting that there is no significant wealth creation or destruction in acquisitions when a chaebol-owned bidder takes over.
Nonetheless, the negative coefficient of BID30GRP indicates that target shareholders do not gain or even lose when a chaebol takes over. Based upon this result, it may not be certain that either the "value-added view" or the "tunneling view" is true.
Among control variables MERGER, CASH, TIME and TGTSIZE are significant.
Merger has a significant positive impact on target shareholder wealth. Consistent with earlier studies, cash consideration has a significant positive impact on target shareholder wealth compared to a share exchange offer. The positively significant coefficient of TIME for bidders implies that mergers and acquisitions during the turbulent and liquidity-scarce period are a value enhancing strategic choice for bidders. The negative coefficient of RELSIZE suggests that target shareholders gain when the bidder takes over a smaller target.
The smallness of the target enables it to be more easily integrated with the bidder. Thus, more premium can be paid to the target shareholders.
Insert table 3 about here
The Effect of Ownership Structure on the Combined Value-Weighted Portfolio Returns
The regression model for the combined value-weighted portfolio returns in Table 4 (BID30GRP) is not significant, the negative coefficient of BID30GRP indicates that target shareholders do not gain or even lose when a chaebol takes over.
These results coincide with those of the preceding model 1 in Table 3 .
In the mean time, the effect of bidder-related ownership variables, say, bidder ownermanagers ownership (BIDMGR) and the institutional ownership of a bidder (BIDINST), is not significant. It may imply that the bidder ownership structure does not create significant value in acquisitions while the target ownership structure does.
Insert table 4 about here
DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, using the cases of Korean mergers and acquisitions where owner-managers play an important role in making acquisition decisions, the two competing views, say, the neoclassical view and the agency view, are examined within the context of owner-managers and non-controlling shareholders. In our sample, the result is favorable for the agency view that there could be situations when owner-managers have incentives to deviate from the acquisition decisions that maximize the benefits of all the shareholders. When a tender is a right choice for all shareholders, for example, managers may choose to decide not to tender for their own interests such as continued independency or job security.
It is not uncommon that we see the agency problem among the Korean listed companies. For many Korean public companies, it is not difficulty to find; a founder still manages his own company; a founder has a strong emotional attachment for his business he has built from a scratch; sons of the founder or related family members are currently involved in the management; a founder and his family believe that they ultimately own the business;
professional managers could be hired, if necessary, but they have to follow 'our' directions; and a son would possibly succeed the founder. Under these sentiments which are quite common in the Korean society, professional managers would not have power enough not to follow what the 'owners' say. If owner-managers desperately maintain their control power in managing the business, it is likely that the incentives of owner-managers would not always be closely aligned with those of non-controlling shareholders.
Given that there is an imbalance of control power in management, favorably for ownermanagers and unfavorably for non-controlling shareholders, how can the agency conflicts be prevented, reduced or solved? This paper explores the effect of institutional ownership of a target on the takeover premiums in order to examine how effective such agency monitoring mechanism is. The result implies that the presence of (proactive) institutional investors in the shareholding could ensure efficient monitoring of the opportunistic behavior of owner-managers.
Assuming that they are more informative and knowledgeable than individual investors, intuitively, the involvement of institutional investors at the board or share holding level would deter any opportunistic decisions by owner-managers and would improve the quality of corporate governance structure.
These check-and-balance activities by institutional investors could enhance the value of firm as seen in the event of SK Corporation (SK) and Sovereign Asset Management (Sovereign) in 2003-4. While it has bought about 15% of outstanding shares of SK which is managed and owned mainly by Chairman Choi, Tae Won and his family, Sovereign has asked the incumbent owner-managers to resign from and to reform the structure of board of directors. During the event, the SK share price has gone up from about USD 11 to about USD 40. It is reported that Sovereign has earned the capital gains of around USD 800 million upon settlement.
In the sample of Korean cases, the result that the impact of bidder's toehold is positively significant suggests that the signaling model of Choudhry and Jegadeesh (1994) holds true.
Bidder's action prior to acquisition announcement to buy target shares could be a strong signal to the public that the deal is excellent. Especially during the first half of the sample period of 1996-2000, the Korean M&A market has been extremely favorable for bidders due to the turbulent and liquidity-scarce environment caused by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. At that time, various targets are available at cheaper prices, while there are few qualified bidders. When they find a very attractive deal through which synergy can be materialized, the bidder may want to buy more toeholds when shares are cheaper before the bid. Therefore, bidder's toehold could be a strong signal for excellent deal.
As for the chaebol effect, it is not clear whether the "value-added view" or the "tunneling view" is true. If a target, say, an LCD parts manufacturing company, is acquired to be a member 15 of Samsung group, for example, is this good or bad news for the target shareholders? The answer may depend on how to evaluate both the possible cost of 'tunneling' and the amount of positive synergy or value the acquisition could create. In our sample, the chaebol effect is not conclusive, but the negative sign may reflect the fact that target shareholders do not gain when a chaebol takes over.
In sum, we find evidence that the distribution of target ownership is related with takeover premium in owner-manager dominant acquisitions. While the agency conflict between managers and shareholders is central in the literature based on the mergers and acquisitions in US, in owner-manager dominant acquisitions, more crucial is the agency problem between ownermanagers and non-controlling shareholders. For many Asian public firms including our sample Korean firms, the agency conflict is more likely to arise between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
Several implications may be drawn from the results. First, from the perspective of legislators, there may be a need to establish some regulatory mechanisms to prevent potential abuses of minority shareholders. Second, ownership and management may need to be separate more clearly. Requiring some independent outside directors into the board could be a way to resolve this issue. Finally, the reinforced role of board of directors with appropriate authorities and responsibilities may enhance the quality and transparency of corporate governance.
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